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AFTERWORD:
CONFLICTS AS A LAW OF LAWS?
MARIANNE CONSTABLE*
I
Law, however conceived, tells its addressees what to do. “Conflicts of laws”
decides what law governs when two or more laws claim to tell an addressee
what to do. Conflicts is, in some sense then, a law of laws. Just as Hannah
Arendt suggested that law constitutes the walls of the polis and that domestic
constitutional law is in some sense prior to and distinct from the local and
national politics it enables,1 so too a rethought private international law—as a
law of laws—offers exciting possibilities for international or transnational—not
merely interstate—politics in an era of increased globalization.
The articles in this symposium suggest that private international law,
rethought, could constitute another way of thinking not only about
international commercial transactions, but also about meaningful cross-state
politics and actions by non-simply-state players. When the traditional forms,
contexts, and inscriptions of private international law are shaken up just a bit,
they offer—to jurisprudence and political theory, but to other fields as well—
fresh ways of considering old questions of relations between states and
international law, of relations between domestic laws and fundamental rights, of
the recognition of everyday relationships and statuses of persons under varying
local laws and customs, and of the proper governance of financial transactions
across markets. In its openness to a multiplicity of laws and to what counts as
law and in its attention to questions of what to do, conflicts of law as the “law of
laws” of our time productively challenges mainstream political-theoretical
accounts of sovereignty and citizenship. As it does so, it also blurs the ostensibly
bright lines between public and private, state and individual, that seem to
ground many liberal institutions of law. The articles thus provoke us to think
further not only about conflicts and politics, but also about what is to become of
law as we know it.
In the far-ranging accounts of private international law these articles
provide, private international law appears in many guises. Conflicts of law.
Transnational private law. Lex mercatoria. International law merchant. Laws of
private business transactions. Global economic law. Extraterritorial state law.
Copyright © 2008 by Marianne Constable.
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1. HANNAH ARENDT, THE HUMAN CONDITION 63–64, 194–99 (1958).
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Normative ordering. System of regulation. Technique. Principle. Rules. Form.
Practice. Outmoded. And revitalized—or potentially so.
Conventionally conceived, private international law distinguishes itself from
public international law by its concern not with conflicts involving states and
“public”—or criminal and constitutional—law, but with suits between private
parties, in such areas as torts, contracts, property, and family law. Private
international law or “conflicts law” traditionally addresses which law governs
when parties disagree as to whose law should govern. The rethought private
international law that emerges from this issue draws attention to international
and transnational—not merely interstate—conflicts. And the conflicts described
ensue among parties outside, beyond, within states—rather than between
“private” parties. Even as conflicts are addressed by state institutions, the
articles emphasize the permeable and overlapping identities of legal parties
whose primary identification is not state citizenship and whose appeal to law is
not necessarily to that of positive state law. Together, the articles thus suggest
that private international law may offer fruitful insights into the multitudinous
and multilayered conflicts of the more-broadly conceived “laws” of a global
age.
The importance of this insight transcends the scholarly field and practice of
that area of law variously known as conflicts of law or private international law.
It resonates for all who are interested in the meanings and possibilities of law
and of politics and judgment in a so-called era of globalization. In what follows,
this Afterword first shows how questions of conflicts relate to questions of
sovereignty, citizenship, and the public–private distinction in politics and
economics. It then considers the ramifications of considering conflicts as a law
of laws and what such consideration reveals about law in our time.
II
CONFLICTS, LAW, AND POLITICS
Political theorists and others often seem daunted by law. Perhaps the
specialization implied by professional training keeps many scholars interested in
politics away from legal texts, doctrine, and theory. Perhaps the commitment of
political theorists to their own canon largely keeps them from discussing law in
any but the most general terms and legal issues in any terms other than those of
rights and constitutional values. Whatever the case, conflicts law—itself often
considered a marginal area of law in legal education and legal theory—shows
how political theorists and others neglect law at their peril. Even if one does not
go so far as to accept Arendt’s notion of law as constituting the walls of the city,
law is fundamental to politics. In a world where politics is all too often
conceived simply in relation to the state, conflicts turns out to have much to say
about key concerns of political theorists with, for instance, sovereignty and
citizenship.
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A. Sovereignty
Conflicts of law are regularly adjudicated through state (and European
Union) courts. Yet an adjudicating state’s consideration and acknowledgment
of the law of a foreign state appears as something other than simply the
adjudicating state’s positivist domestic law. Although such consideration may
be considered a principle of domestic law, it can also be characterized—as Joel
Paul’s article on “comity” reveals2—in other ways: as mutuality of obligation, as
practice, custom, interest, necessity, policy, and so forth.
The ostensible limit to state authority (from the point of view of the
adjudicating state) and the ostensible expansion of state jurisdiction (from the
point of view of the foreign state whose law is being invoked) cautions against
absolutist and simplistic analyses of state sovereignty. Neither strictly state nor
interstate (or “international”) law, what is the status of the law that decides
among laws? If conflicts law, roughly speaking, governs conflicts among laws,
what becomes of the state and of the authority and reach of state law?
States are conventionally thought to lawfully exercise jurisdiction on the
basis of territoriality or of citizenship. Conflicts law itself complicates any easy
identification of a state’s jurisdiction with the physical borders of state territory
or with the membership of its citizen–subjects. Articles such as those of Teemu
Ruskola, on early twentieth-century U.S. exercise of extraterritorial jurisdiction
in China,3 and of Andrea Slane, on the challenges to legal conceptions of
jurisdiction posed by Internet practices,4 show how even conflicts-law categories
may become more complicated—or their complications reduced or denied—in
practice. Brenda Cossman’s study of the appearance in public cultural spaces of
non–legally recognized “migrating” same-sex marriages—unions entered into in
one jurisdiction whose partners seek recognition in another—suggests the
further possibility of spaces that are only incompletely governed by state law.5
B. Citizenship
The study of conflicts law not only cautions against taking territoriality for
granted, but also warns against accepting parallels between such apparent
dichotomies as citizen and noncitizen, rights-bearer and non–rights bearer, state
subject and non–state subject. A party invoking a foreign law relates to both the
foreign law and the law of the state in which the suit occurs. At a minimum
then, conflicts law suggests the possibility of a party’s relations and obligations
to the laws of more than one state.

2. Joel R. Paul, The Transformation of International Comity, 71 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 19
(Summer 2008).
3. Teemu Ruskola, Colonialism Without Colonies: On the Extraterritorial Jurisprudence of the
U.S. Court for China, 71 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 217 (Summer 2008).
4. Andrea Slane, Tales, Techs, and Territories: Private International Law, Globalization, and the
Legal Construction of Borderlessness on the Internet, 71 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 129 (Summer 2008).
5. Brenda Cossman, Betwixt and Between Recognition: Migrating Same-Sex Marriages and the
Turn Toward the Private, 71 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 153 (Summer 2008).

AFTERWORD_BOOK PROOF_FINAL2.DOC

346

LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS

10/27/2008 12:42:06 PM

[Vol. 71:343

Conflicts certainly occurred and were adjudicated before the emergence of
state law as such, however.6 In England and in the U.S., changes in conceptions
of membership, alienage, and community correspond to changes in legal
practices for dealing with conflicts and with the story of the emergence of legal
positivist conceptions of state law. In part an account of how aliens are and are
not accorded their law in Anglo-American history, Karen Knop’s article argues
for thinking about citizenship less in terms of political participation or cultural
membership as such than in terms of status in and access to law.7
Although one’s identities are not limited to those accorded by state law,
state courts recognize status under state law. Audra Simpson shows how the
dismissal of a RICO suit against R.J. Reynolds brought in the U.S. by Canada
to recover revenue losses presumed the legitimacy of only two regimes of state
law and completely disregarded the possibility of indigenous political orders.8
As lex mercatoria becomes a buzzword for those with an interest in a-national
or supra-national systems and a concern for market liberalization, Nikitas
Hatzimihail too moves beyond a concern with state law to show how different
historical narratives of the law merchant correlate to differing contemporary
legacies and disputes in contemporary private international law.9
C. The “Private”
If a rethought private international law draws attention to the limitations of
usual thinking about state sovereignty and political membership, it also disturbs
stock thinking in law and elsewhere about the very distinctions between private
and public law, the nature of the private sphere, and the meaning of a private
person or party. Others have suggested that private international law may offer
resources for thinking about public law. Jacco Bomhoff’s article critiques and
qualifies this suggestion while developing it.10 Bomhoff looks to cases involving
extraterritorial extensions of rights and execution of foreign judgments to show
how private international law offers compelling ways of thinking about
domestic fundamental-rights issues in cases that involve “foreign elements” and
are not wholly internal to the domestic order.
In the context of an enlarged “private sphere” that includes global or at
least transnational commercial activity, “private” parties’ contractual
agreements to use arbitration or to sue in the courts of or to abide by the law of

6. See MARIANNE CONSTABLE, THE LAW OF THE OTHER: THE MIXED JURY AND CHANGING
CONCEPTIONS OF CITIZENSHIP, LAW AND KNOWLEDGE 7–8 (1993).
7. Karen Knop, Citizenship, Public and Private, 71 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 309 (Summer
2008).
8. Audra Simpson, Subjects of Sovereignty: Indigeneity, the Revenue Rule, and the Juridics of
Failed Consent, 71 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 191 (Summer 2008).
9. Nikitas E. Hatzimihail, The Many Lives—and Faces—of Lex Mercatoria: History as Genealogy
in International Business Law, 71 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 169 (Summer 2008).
10. Jacco Bomhoff, The Reach of Rights: “The Foreign” and “The Private” in Conflict-of-Laws,
State-Action, and Fundamental-Rights Cases with Foreign Elements, 71 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 39
(Summer 2008).
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a particular state challenge the ostensible primacy of state law and interests.
Robert Wai’s article warns that private-law norms in some ways allow private
interests to regulate state and nonstate “normative orders.”11 Fleur Johns’s
article then shows how private-law presumptions attributing coherence to the
agreements of “private” parties downplay—or downright disregard—the
diverse practices of many contributors to “deals” where boiler-plate arbitration,
forum-selection, and choice-of-law clauses may receive little or no attention.12
III
LAW OF LAWS OR LAW NO MORE?
The relevance of the analyses in these articles to concerns in a variety of
fields—politics, economics, sociology, anthropology, jurisprudence—raises
issues about the place of legal scholarship and of conflicts law not only in the
academy but more broadly. Setting aside the topic of transdisciplinarity
addressed in the introduction to this issue, one might still wonder whether
conflicts law, interpreted here as a law of laws, might someday become a
“model” for resolving transnational conflicts.
The answer is no. Even as the innovative and subtle articles in this
symposium show how conflicts law offers new ways of thinking about politics,
none go so far as to assert that the new private international law could decide,
determine, or dictate outcomes. Indeed, the articles mine private international
law for what it offers to various fields of analysis, ever-cognizant of its
limitations. Ralf Michaels’ article even shows how the appropriation of private
international law by the subfield of economics known as rational choice, for
instance, succeeds only in regurgitating in economic formulas ideas already
found in private-international-law doctrines.13 And even as Annelise Riles
explicitly suggests that conflicts of law can serve as a resource for thinking
about conflicts of cultures, she is careful to acknowledge the circumscribed
forms within which conventional conflicts law analyses proceed.14
All this is to the good. That the rethought private international law of this
issue could never serve as a model for law or global governance is not a
drawback. On the contrary, it points—as do many of the articles—to the
limitations inherent in our desires for law to provide formulas, models, and failsafe techniques for telling us what to do. At a time when the knowledge and
reality of law is generally taken to be the knowledge and reality of statistics and
of state law that claims increasing mastery over the world, understanding
conflicts as a law of laws offers possibilities for thinking about politics—and

11. Robert Wai, The Interlegality of Transnational Private Law, 71 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 107
(Summer 2008).
12. Fleur Johns, Performing Party Autonomy, 71 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 243 (Summer 2008).
13. Ralf Michaels, Economics of Law as Choice of Law, 71 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 73 (Summer
2008).
14. Annelise Riles, Cultural Conflicts, 71 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 273 (Summer 2008).
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law—in terms other than those of the state, state policies, state interests, and
the instrumental means thereto.
State power today lies in a mastery of social organization that manifests
itself in state policies, which are neither the outcome of divine sovereignty nor
the direct commands of human sovereigns. States and their policies deny the
status of law to all that does not pertain to the interests of the state and of the
society it ostensibly governs. Acknowledging the laws of others, as conflicts law
does (even when it decides in favor of the forum law or treats the foreign law
selected as “fact”), drives a wedge into the seemingly monolithic claims of
domestic state and public international (or, again, read more properly,
“interstate”) law to govern or to establish the terms for self-rule.
For Hannah Arendt, fifty years ago, “the . . . ‘public’ signifie[d] the world
itself . . . . To live together in the world,” she wrote, “means essentially that a
world of things is between those who have it in common, as a table is located
between those who sit around it; the world, like every in-between, relates and
separates men at the same time.”15 Today, the articles in this symposium
suggest, the ostensibly public world that “relates and separates men” is not
constructed by a constitutional state law that forms the walls and boundaries of
and in the city; constitutional state law no longer makes the table of politics.
Rather, a rethought private international law, or conflicts law as law of laws,
constructs a place in which to consider and discuss how a variety of laws join
and divide—or “relate and separate”—parties over issues in common and
overlapping causes of action.
The understanding of politics emerging from this symposium upsets the
primacy that scholars—of global and local phenomena alike—often accord to
politics over law. Law—now broadly understood as non–simply state law—is, as
Arendt suggested of constitutional law, prior to the politics of states and also of
transnational interactions. The priority of law over politics, though, comes at a
cost for those committed to using law to determine what to do. Under the new
pluralist conceptions of law, as much as a law claims to tell someone what to do,
it cannot determine what is done. Unlike current state law, its claims are not
compelling: they must not only be heard, but must also be considered in the
context of the claims of other laws before they are acted on.
The priority of law over politics that emerges in the notion of conflicts as a
law of laws thus weighs in against the likelihood of finding in such law
determinate legal solutions or answers to social and global problems and
conflicts. In this sense, the law of laws is a useless law. It fails at the task that
state law has inherited and accepted as its own: reconciling, or articulating the
reconciliation of, is and ought. And yet, in failing at this task, the law of laws
presented in this symposium nevertheless reveals something about us that state
law, in all its knowledge and power, has missed: the world is not in need of such
reconciliation. The need for the reconciliation of is and ought, like the need for

15. Arendt, supra note 1, at 52.
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the recognition of the conflicts manifest in our laws, is ours. We need to know
and judge our world and others in it; we need to be known and judged by
others. Law—not necessarily state law—is the way, this symposium shows, that
we know and judge others and allow ourselves to be known and judged by
others.

